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RIVALS’ REACTIONS TO MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS

Abstract
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) research has principally focused on attributes of the acquiring
firm and post-acquisition outcomes. To extend our knowledge, we focus on external factors, in
particular rival responses, and explore when and how rivals respond to their competitor’s
acquisitions. Leveraging the awareness-motivation-capability (AMC) framework, we predict and
find evidence that a rival’s dependence on markets in common with the acquirer, resourse
similarity between rival and acquirer, and a rival’s organizational slack increase the volume and
in some cases also the complexity of a rival’s competitive actions following an acquisition.
Further, the type of acquisition positively moderates some of these relationships. The results
extend our understanding of the influence of M&As on competitive dynamics in the marketplace.

Keywords: Mergers and Acquisitions, Competitive Dynamics, Competitive Action Repertoire,
Competitive Response, Content Analysis
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Introduction
Prevailing theory and conventional wisdom suggest that firms engage in acquisitions for various
reasons, including diversifying into new market domains, capturing and leveraging synergistic
resource exchanges between merging firms, and overcoming barriers to entry, among others (Hitt
et al., 2001; Jensen and Ruback, 1983). Importantly, acquisitions also influence an industry’s
competitive dynamics; Kim and Singal (1993) and Chatterjee (1986) found that acquisitions can
reduce competitive rivalry, lead to collusion among competitors, and engender accommodation
of the merging firms by their rivals, all creating a competitive context favorable to the acquirer.
Yet, empirical research has found that returns to acquisitions are often negative (e.g., Jensen and
Ruback, 1983; King et al., 2004) and identified various internal costs and challenges in the
acquisition process for the causes of weak merger performance. Explanations for poor returns
include takeover premiums paid to the target firm’s shareholders, unanticipated post-acquisition
integration costs, managers’ pursuit of personal interests via acquisition, etc. (Hitt et al., 1990;
Sirower, 1997). Further, there is evidence that rivals may act aggressively in the pre-merger
phase, for instance, by bidding on a target to elevate its price, which reduces the returns to an
acquisition (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1995). Moreover, Ghemawat and Ghadar (2000) found
that rivals engage in bold strategic moves to exploit the distraction of acquirer management
during the merger process.
The focus on the internal costs and rival behavior prior to and during an acquisition significantly
limit our understanding of the disappointing outcomes (King et al., 2004). However, recent
research on competitive dynamics and anecdotal evidence suggest the importance of the
external, post-acquisition competitive context. Extant research suggests acquirers may gain
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advantages from acquisitions that negatively impact their rivals. We contend that some of the
acquirer’s rivals do not accommodate the acquisition or collude with the acquirer, as previous
work has shown. Instead, certain rivals view M&As as stimulating hostility and competitive
disruption, leading to a different competitive landscape post merger that weakens the acquirer’s
post-acquisition performance. Additionally, Markman and colleagues (2009) suggest that
acquisitions contribute to product market rivalry and also to factor market rivalry that can
exacerbate and intensify product market rivalry.
Therefore, an important reason M&As often fail to meet expectations is the inability of the
acquiring firm to account for the effects of rivals’ aggressive competitive responses following
the acquisition (Haleblian et al., 2009). As a result, examination of potentially aggressive—rather
than accommodating—responses to acquisitions is critical to better understand post-acquisition
outcomes. Moreover, understanding the drivers of aggressive responses is essential to predict the
potential success (or lack thereof) of M&As. The recent evidence on aggressive reactions by
rivals suggests that examining the competitive context of M&A and the characteristics of the
firms involved can advance our understanding of this important phenomenon. Prior research on
competitive behaviors such as rivals aggressive or accommodating actions after an acquisition,
suggest the importance of identifying the organizational and competitive characteristics that
prompt rival responses. Thus, our research question is: Following an acquisition, which
organizational and competitive conditions prompt rivals to compete more aggressively? We
build on the awareness-motivation-capability (AMC) framework used in competitive dynamics
research to predict when and how rivals respond (Chen, 1996; Chen et al., 2007).
Our study makes two concomitant contributions. Answering the call for new theory to explain
the consequences of M&As (Haleblian et al., 2009; King et al., 2004), we offer an alternative,
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competition-centric explanation for the generally weak performance of acquisitions. This cause
of the weak performance is external to the deal and to the merging firms, specifically,
competitive pressures engendered by the acquisition. Our study challenges previous work
suggesting that rivals tend to accommodate M&As. Second, by exploring the link between
corporate-level decisions (M&A) and competitive behavior (action repertoires), our study
demonstrates the generalizability of recent research on product and factor market rivalry (Chen
et al., 2007; Markman et al., 2009; Smith et al., 2001). Thus, it extends competitive dynamics
into the domain of corporate strategy and its consequences. Our findings help to identify specific
rival conditions—i.e., dependence on markets in common with the acquirer, rival slack, and
resource similarity between rival and acquirer—that motivate and enable rivals to respond
aggressively to their competitors’ acquisitions.

A competition-centric view of M&A activity
Prior research examined the potential for acquisitions to reduce rivalry by decreasing the number
of competitors, thus increasing market power, and the potential to produce gains from economies
of scope (Clougherty and Duso, 2011). Alternatively, Chatterjee (1986) suggested that some
acquisitions produce ‘collusive synergy’—i.e., the ability of the acquirer to increase prices
because of collusion among the industry participants. Similarly, Kim and Singal (1993) found
that merging two rival airlines led to higher prices thereafter. These studies strongly suggest the
exploitation of market power and tacit collusion between rivals associated with mergers.
Research on corporate strategy has traditionally conceptualized M&As based on a narrow costbenefit analysis—related to market power, synergies, etc. Related studies largely disregarded
rivals’ responses in evaluating the outcomes of acquisitions. Others found that rivals concede
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exploitation of merger gains to the acquirer (e.g., Kim and Singal, 1993). Such a concession may
take the form of increasing prices, reducing capacity, leaving markets, etc. More recently,
Clougherty and Duso (2011) found that approximately one quarter of the large-scale, horizontal
acquisitions (and rivals of the acquirers and targets) produced collusive synergies. Yet, the extant
research does not explicitly and directly account for the broader competitive context; namely, the
possibility of aggressive competitive responses by rivals that counteract some or all of the
potential benefits of M&A to the acquirer. Similar concerns regarding rival reactions to their
competitors’ strategic moves have recently been suggested for research on strategic alliances
(Park and Zhou, 2005) and factor markets (Capron and Chatain, 2008; Markman et al., 2009).
Competitive dynamics research suggests that the success of a firm’s actions depends on the
number and range of rivals’ reactions. Simon (2005) found that rivals, in general, do not respond
uniformly—either via accommodation or retaliation—to new entries into their market. Owing to
a variety of organizational and competitive factors, some rival-incumbents are strongly
motivated to respond aggressively by carrying out a wide range of competitive actions—price
cuts, product improvements, advertising campaigns, new products, etc. (Geroski, 1995)—while
others are less motivated to respond aggressively. Further, the intensity and form of the firm’s
competitive responses to a rival’s actions are contingent on a number of important organizational
and competitive conditions (cf., Smith et al., 2001). For instance, Silverman and Baum (2002)
found that competitive intensity in response to the formation of an alliance by a rival depends on
the specific nature of the alliance: horizontal, upstream, or downstream.
Upon completing an acquisition, the acquirer may realize an improvement in its competitive
position or in its competitive advantage (Hitt et al., 2001). These potential benefits may signal
that the acquirer has enhanced its capability to compete (Chen et al., 2007), thereby leading
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rivals to view the acquisition as a competitive threat (Garcia-Sanchez et al., 2014). Indeed, one
study found that nearly 50 percent of rivals of acquirers lose market value because of the
acquisition (Clougherty and Duso, 2011). 1 While price changes subsequent to an acquisition are
easily observable and can be matched by rivals, the full range of an acquisition’s outcomes are
harder for rivals to assess. Concerned with differential gains and losses relative to the acquiring
firm, rivals are likely motivated to respond to an acquisition with aggressive competitive action
in order to defend their positions in product and/or factor markets and also to minimize or
neutralize the potential advantages gained by the acquirer (Capron and Chatain, 2008).
The business press highlights numerous examples of aggressive competitive responses carried
out by an acquirer’s rivals. For instance, when Gillette acquired Duracell in 1996, top managers
expected the deal to support earnings growth of the merged firms for several years into the
future. Based on Gillette’s resources and market strength, management claimed that the
combined firms would develop and market a successful premium-priced battery. Yet, rivals
Rayovac and Energizer attacked with price cuts and special promotions. As a result of aggressive
responses by rivals to the acquisition, Duracell lost overall market share and operating margins
declined by one third (Business Week Online, 2000).
These considerations strongly suggest that a merger can increase competitive pressures and elicit
aggressive competitive responses by rivals of the merging firms. Yet, M&A research has not
fully explored the drivers of rivals’ responses. Drawing from core ideas in competitive dynamics,
we argue that post-acquisition competitive behavior is derivative of relevant and relative
characteristics of competing firms in the industry.
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Sources of competitive tension and observed competitive aggressiveness
Scholars in competitive dynamics have developed theory and empirical methods focused on firm
strategy as a competitive action, defined broadly as observable, externally-directed, marketbased competitive moves taken with the intent to improve a firm’s relative competitive position
(Grimm et al., 2006; Smith et al., 2001). Early research in this stream examined the actionresponse dyads (e.g., Chen, et al., 1992; Smith et al., 1991), whereby the characteristics of a
singular competitive action are important predictors of a rival’s singular competitive response. 2
In ongoing head-to-head competitive interaction, however, firms carry out an endless series of
competitive moves and countermoves—e.g., price cutting, introducing new products, marketing
campaigns, capacity expansions, etc.—to keep rivals off balance, defend market share, and
achieve/sustain superior performance (D’Aveni, 1994; Kirzner, 1973; Smith et al., 2001). In this
vein, research has examined a variety of antecedents and consequences of the entire set of
competitive actions completed in a given period of time, the competitive action repertoire (e.g.,
Ferrier et al., 1999; Miller and Chen, 1994; 1996). Our study, in effect, is the first to tap into both
the action-response and action repertoire levels of aggregation by examining how one firm’s
singular corporate-level competitive action (an acquisition) influences two fundamental
attributes of a rival’s competitive strategy: Action repertoire volume (how many actions the rival
carries out) and action repertoire complexity (the extent to which the rival’s set of actions consists
of a range of different types of actions).
Central to competitive dynamics is the conceptualization and measurement of competitive
aggressiveness. Drawing from Austrian economics, Hypercompetition theory, and corporate
entrepreneurship research (Covin and Slevin, 1991; D’Aveni, 1994; Kirzner, 1973), competitive
aggressiveness is defined as the propensity for firms to directly challenge rivals by carrying out a
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sustained and diverse series of competitive actions (Ferrier, 2001; Ferrier and Lee, 2002; Ferrier
et al., 1999). Beyond the number of competitive actions, the diversity of such actions is
important because firms often respond uniquely to the particular character of the initial action
(Chen and Miller, 2012). For instance, cost leaders may be more responsive to price cuts than
quality leaders. We thus explore the conditions—i.e., rival and acquirer firm characteristics—
under which an acquisition made by a firm increases the competitive tension and triggers an
aggressive competitive response among rivals in a given industry. 3
The emergent theoretical framework within competitive dynamics pinpoints three implicit
drivers of aggressive competitive behavior—the awareness of rivals, the motivation to carry out
competitive actions against one another, and the capability to carry out such actions—known as
the AMC framework (Chen, 1996; Chen et al., 2007). Taken together, elements of the AMC
framework manifest the competitive tension between rivals, or ‘…the strain between a focal firm
and a given rival that is likely to result in the firm taking action against the rival’ (Chen et al.,
2007, p. 101). In our study, an acquisition carried out by the initiating firm is viewed as a
specific, observable, competitive action that often changes the competitive equilibrium between
firms in the market thereby transforming the static competitive ‘tension’ between the acquirer
and its rivals into a dynamic, sustained, and potentially aggressive ‘interaction.’
A rival’s awareness of its interdependence with other firms is conditioned by the dependence of
the rival on markets common with these firms and on the similarity of the rival’s resources to the
firms (Chen, 1996). Market dependence refers to the proportion of revenues or profits a firm
derives from a particular product market; the larger the proportion, the higher the market
dependence. Resource similarity is the extent to which two firms have comparable resource
endowments in type and amount. Given high market dependence, rivals are keenly aware of one
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another and their actions. Also, when market dependence is high, rivals are more likely to
recognize the need to defend their market position from competitors whose actions, such as an
acquisition, may threaten this position (Smith et al., 2001). Resource similarity makes rivals
more aware of the potential consequences of strategic actions taken by their competitors and
increases competitive tension (Chen et al., 2007).
Market dependence and resource similarity among competitors may also motivate them to
respond to competitive actions of their rivals (Chen, 1996). When firms depend on specific
markets, they may see the need to defend their market position if it is threatened by a
competitor’s competitive actions. Firms with similar resources have similar strengths and
weaknesses, are likely to pursue similar strategies, and believe that they have the capability to
compete on an equal footing (Chen et al., 2007; Gimeno and Woo, 1996; Harrison et al., 1991).
An acquisition as a competitive action, in particular acquisition, may shift the relative resource
balance between two firms and weaken the position of the rival relative to the acquirer because it
often provides access to scarce strategic factors providing a greater opportunity to secure an
advantage (Markman et al., 2009). Consequently, resource similarity, similar to market
dependence, can motivate aggressive rival responses to an acquisition.
The capability of a firm to respond to a competitor’s actions depends on the firm’s resources,
such as financial and human capital (Chen, 1996). Organizational slack is a ‘cushion of
resources’ that allows an organization to more quickly and effectively adapt to external changes
and modify its strategy relative to firms with fewer resources (Haleblian et al., 2012; Wan and
Yiu, 2009). Slack resources can facilitate or enable a variety of strategic behaviors, such as being
an early actor in a merger wave (Haleblian et al., 2012), initiating strategic change (Bourgeois,
1981), and carrying out a large number of competitive actions (Ferrier, 2001). A competitor’s
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acquisition can change competitive conditions, and slack allows firms not only to act in order to
exploit specific opportunities but also to react to threats in the competitive environment.
Furthermore, an acquisition represents a unique type of competitive action within an industry,
namely a horizontal acquisition, a diversifying move across industries, a vertical acquisition, or
an unrelated acquisition. 4 Because related acquisitions are more disruptive to the focal industry
than other acquisition types, essentially merging two competitors into a larger one, rivals are
likely to be more aware of the acquisition’s implications and potentially more motivated to
respond. In particular a horizontal acquisition may pose a particular threat to some (or many)
rivals, similar to horizontal alliances (Silverman and Baum, 2002). Though a horizontal
acquisition reduces the number of rivals in an industry, it also combines the strengths of two
competitors, reducing the relative value of the strengths held by the rival(s). Such an attack via
horizontal acquisition can motivate a rival to respond aggressively, especially if it depends
highly on this market and the resource balance across rivals in the industry is threatened. Our full
theoretical model is depicted in Figure 1. These relationships have heretofore not been examined
in depth in the M&A or competitive dynamics research.
--------------------------------------------Insert Figure 1 about here
--------------------------------------------

Hypotheses
Market dependence as awareness-enhancing and aggressiveness-motivating
The motivation to respond to an acquisition may hinge on the extent to which the rival is
dependent on the acquirer’s primary markets (Chen, 1996). Dependence on the same product
market gives the rival knowledge of the potential benefits associated with the acquisition. For
instance, the acquisition may produce greater market power for the merging firms or provide the
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capability to create innovations potentially valuable to customers in the market. Rivals with high
dependence on a certain market are likely to have more knowledge about these markets than
rivals with lower dependence, for example, because of greater investments in monitoring those
markets. Accordingly, this knowledge makes the rival more aware of the potential outcomes of
the acquisition because the rival can better anticipate customer benefits and reactions to the
acquisition. Further, market knowledge may allow the rival to target its responses specifically at
the resource advantages the acquirer will accrue from the acquisition. The heightened potential to
reduce the acquirer’s gains—and to minimize the rival’s losses—from the acquisition can
motivate a rival to react aggressively (Capron and Chatain, 2008; Yu and Cannella, 2007).
Likewise, the rival’s knowledge of a particular industry and its experience in successfully
overcoming competitive challenges, such as a merger, may additionally motivate targeted
competitive responses that efficiently use the rivals’ resources.
Understanding the effects of the acquisition on customers and markets more clearly also reduces
the uncertainty involved with an aggressive response. The higher the expected gains from the
acquisition, for instance an improved ability to serve customers, the stronger the potential
reaction of the acquirer to aggressive rival behavior intended to reduce these gains. As the rival
can more effectively anticipate the consequences of its aggressive behavior, uncertainty is
reduced, incentivizing aggressive action over taking a defensive position.
Furthermore, if a rival is highly dependent on the market, it may operate only in one or few
markets. Rivals with low market dependence must also operate in other markets but can
potentially compete with the merging firms in several markets. Gimeno (1999) found that
multimarket competition reduces rivalry as firms recognize that aggressive competitor actions
and responses in one market can have detrimental consequences in the other markets in which
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they compete. Yet, higher market dependence suggests that the rival is less likely to be engaged
in multimarket competition with the acquirer, thereby diminishing the motivation for mutual
forbearance. Thus, we expect that the rival’s dependence on the acquirer’s primary markets
decreases mutual forbearance and increases the likelihood of an aggressive competitive response.
HYPOTHESIS 1. Following an acquisition, the rival’s dependence on the acquirer’s primary
markets is positively related to an increase in the rival’s level of competitive aggressiveness.
Resource similarity as awareness-enhancing and aggressiveness-motivating
The similarity of the rival’s resources to those of the acquirer or its target may also affect the
intensity of competitive rivalry following the acquisition (Chen, 1996). Some valuable resources
and resource combinations may be attained only via acquisition of other firms. Consequently,
threats to the resource balance among rivals via acquisitions can signal to rivals that the acquirer
will be a more potent competitor, thereby heightening the level of competitive tension (Chen et
al., 2007). For instance, acquisitions may allow the acquirer to overcome a competitive resource
advantage held by a rival (Markman et al., 2009). More generally, with factor market rivalry,
research suggests that acquisitions are particularly likely to result in an aggressive competitive
response because they can allow acquirers access to the most valuable strategic resources, that is,
resources that can produce a competitive advantage (Markman et al., 2009).
These concerns may be particularly salient to the acquirer that expects private synergies from the
acquisition. Private synergies are advantages created from the integration of resources of the
merged firms that no other potential acquirers, including rivals, can expect to gain from the
acquisition (Barney, 1988). Private synergies represent a special incentive, as they are priceneutral. Rivals with resources similar to the acquirer will be particularly concerned about private
synergies that can significantly change the existing resource balance among competitors.
Additionally, only the acquirer will know how to bundle and leverage these resources gained in
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the acquisition. Because rivals cannot adjust their resource portfolio in the same way as the
acquirer, and accommodation of the acquirer will leave rivals with an enduring disadvantage
(Capron and Chatain, 2008), rivals are likely to respond with a range of competitive actions,
perhaps involving price reductions, new marketing campaigns, etc. In this case, an aggressive
response might even distract the acquirer and delay the integration with the target so that
potential private synergies are not quickly or fully realized.
Furthermore, because many benefits from acquisitions are based on resource advantages (Hitt et
al., 2001), rivals with resources similar to those of the acquirer are likely to have a clearer
understanding of the acquisition’s potential resource advantages than rivals with less similar
resources. Indeed, acquisitions provide acquirers with significant new resources, but the value of
these resources is often difficult to realize because of the challenge to integrate the merging
firms’ resources due to different cultures and operations. As such, it may be difficult for the
acquirer to use the new resources effectively for new actions and to respond to rivals after the
acquisition. A rival with high resource similarity vis-à-vis the acquirer and heightened awareness
of the acquisition benefits, is likely more able to develop and implement an effective, aggressive
competitive response to the acquisition. This rival should also have a better understanding of its
potential competitive vulnerability in the marketplace because of the acquisition (Chen, 1996;
Markman et al., 2009). The potential for efficiency in its competitive response may likewise
motivate this rival to respond aggressively (Yu and Cannella, 2007).
Prior research suggests that firms operating in the same market recognize their interdependence
with close competitors and may limit behaviors that risk retaliation (Chen and Miller, 2012).
However, research has shown that similarities between firms increase aggressive behaviors
despite the potential for mutual forbearance (Gimeno and Woo, 1996). Moreover, similar
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resource endowments between competitors have produced rapid competitive responses (Grimm
et al., 2006). Presumably, this is because firms try to avoid becoming resource disadvantaged
when a competitor attempts to gain an advantage over its rivals. These arguments suggest that
resource similarity at the time of an acquisition increases the rival’s motivation to engage in an
aggressive competitive response.
HYPOTHESIS 2. Following an acquisition, the level of resource similarity between the
acquirer and the rival is positively related to an increase in the rival’s level of competitive
aggressiveness.
Slack as aggressiveness-enabling
The rival’s capability to respond to a competitor’s acquisition is partly dependent on resources
that are not fully employed prior to the acquisition. That is, the rival’s competitive responses
often draw on its organizational slack. With few slack resources, the speed and scope of a rival’s
repertoire of potential competitive responses will be more limited, increasing the likelihood of
competitive acquiescence (Smith et al., 1991). Without slack resources, the rival may choose to
accommodate an acquisition and gain at least some benefit by reducing competitive tension.
Conversely, abundant organizational slack allows the rival to aggressively respond to a
competitive challenge (Ferrier, 2001; Ferrier et al., 2002; Smith et al., 1991; Young et al., 1996).
Research shows that firms with slack resources often engage in bolder, more risky competitive
actions (Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1988). This is important because acquisitions are among the
most visible, hard to reverse, and resource-intensive commitments that firms make (Hayward and
Shimizu, 2006). Research also shows that actions with significant effects on the competitive
context provoke a higher number of competitive responses by rivals (Chen et al., 1992). And,
acquisitions often have a significant influence on the competitive context. Yet, aggressive
responses to acquisitions involve high risk for the rival because they may threaten expected
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returns to the acquisition which can provoke a major counter response from the acquirer. To
reduce the risk of a countermove by the acquirer, rivals might accommodate an acquisition
unless they have slack resources that allow for a bold, aggressive response. Only rivals with the
strength (slack) to engage in quick, significant, and effective actions are confident that their
aggressive responses will succeed; their slack enables adaptation in strategy if needed and further
responses to countermoves by the acquirer (Smith et al., 1991; Wan and Yiu, 2009).
HYPOTHESIS 3. Following an acquisition, the rival’s organizational slack is positively
related to an increase in the rival’s level of competitive aggressiveness.
Moderation by acquisition relatedness
Earlier, we indicated that different types of acquisitions have differential effects on rivals of the
acquirer. While an acquisition of an unrelated target may provide the acquirer with very different
resources, thus increasing the uncertainty of the acquisition outcomes, unrelated acquisitions
produce entry into new industries thereby reducing market commonality between acquirer and
rivals. Accordingly, a rival is less likely to react to a competitor’s unrelated acquisition. Related
acquisitions, on the other hand, in particular horizontal ones, heighten the competitive tension
between acquirer and rivals.
In related acquisitions, acquirer, target, and rivals operate in similar markets. Thus, rivals have a
heightened awareness and the motivation to respond aggressively. On one hand, horizontal and
related acquisition may lead to industry consolidation thereby reducing competitive pressures.
Research has found that horizontal acquisitions result in reduced commitment of customers to
the target firm (Berger et al., 1998), thereby creating growth opportunities for rivals. Yet, a
related acquisition reduces a rival’s opportunities to engage in its own related acquisitions as it
decreases the number of potential targets in the industry and can be likened to resource captivity
(Markman et al., 2009). A rival with high dependence on the market in which a related
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acquisition occurred might be particularly threatened by this move because it reduces its own
range of options. Thus, this rival is likely to take other actions to exploit the reduced
commitment of customers to the target firm and perhaps capture greater market share.
Moreover, a related acquisition produces significant resource redeployment from the target to the
acquirer (Capron et al., 1998), threatening the resource balance between the acquirer and rivals.
An evenly matched competitor prior to the acquisition may now become a much more potent,
capable competitor that threatens the market position of the rival thereby increasing competitive
tension (Chen et al., 2007; Silverman and Baum, 2002). From the rival’s point of view, a related
acquisition enables the acquirer to strengthen, for instance, product development, production
facilities, and marketing capabilities that result in economies of scale and disadvantage the rival.
As a result, the rival will seek different means to compete effectively. These arguments suggest
that the type of acquisition moderates both the relationship between rivals’ dependence on
markets common with the acquirer and acquirer-rival resource similarity and aggressive
responses. However, the influence of the capability of rivals to respond (slack resources) is
unlikely to be affected by acquisition relatedness.
HYPOTHESIS 4. The positive relationships between (a) market dependence and (b) resource
similarity with an increase in the level of rivals’ competitive aggressiveness, following and
acquisition, is strengthened by the relatedness of the acquisition.

Methods
Sample
We tested our hypotheses on a sample of firms that designated one of three related industries—
pharmaceutical preparations (SIC 2834), biological products (SIC 2836), or surgical and medical
instruments and apparatus (SIC 3841)—as their primary line of business. These industries are
characterized by precisely-defined boundaries, ensuring that competitive moves implemented by
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industry members are designed to enhance a firm’s industry position relative to rivals. Market
appraisals of pharmaceutical and med-tech firms often rely in large part on estimates of longterm cash flows. Thus, companies widely announce competitive moves that are intended to boost
future valuations. Further, the FDA approval process, the patenting process, and the marketing
process (to doctors) in these industries are similar. Relative to other industry contexts, this allows
us to more precisely observe the competitive moves by firms. Also, because R&D expenditures
by these firms are substantial and products generated from them have blockbuster potential,
competitive interaction is intense. Whereas, most competitive dynamics studies focus on a single
industry, we extended our sampling over several adjacent industries to improve generalizability
and because acquisitions often occur in related industries.
For the firms in our sample, we captured all acquisitions carried out over an 18-year time frame
(1995-2012) reported in the SDC M&A database. We also collected data on each rival’s
competitive responses across a three-year window: The year that the acquisition was announced
(year t) and the two years following (years t+1 and t+2). We limited the sample to acquisitions
in which more than 50 percent of the target was acquired to ensure a controlling interest by the
acquirer and not simply a diversifying investment in another autonomous firm. For access to the
necessary data and including only those firms and acquisitions that are sufficient in size to be
notable by rivals, we sampled acquisitions where target and acquiring firms were both listed on a
U.S. stock market. This process yielded 422 acquisitions during our time frame by acquirers with
their primary line of business in one of the three industries listed above. Not all targets were from
these industries, and we control for the relationship between acquirer and target (see below).
For each acquisition, we identified the top 10 rivals of the acquirer based on rivals’ total assets in
the acquisition year. We used firm size as a criterion when selecting rivals because the largest
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firms in an industry are more likely to view each other as direct competitors and often have their
competitive actions more comprehensively and accurately reported in the media (Chen et al.,
2007; Ferrier et al., 1999). Further, because of the high barriers to entry in the industries
studied—e.g., numerous patents, licensing agreements, lengthy FDA approval process, and steep
R&D spending (Hindle, 2008)—smaller competitors are more specialized than their larger rivals
and can likely overcome only selected barriers. To check for potential bias, we ran analyses with
only reactions of the largest 5 competitors and there were no significant differences.
We considered pharmaceutical and biotech companies to be rivals across several therapeutic
domains and drug categories, so the top 10 rivals in both SIC codes were identified. We treated
the surgical/medical instruments and apparatus industry as a separate set of competing firms
from which we generated a separate list of top 10 rivals. However, there is sufficient evidence
that firms in this industry have resources in common with, are subject to similar barriers to entry,
and are often in multimarket competition with firms in the pharmaceutical and biotech industries.
Financial data were collected on all acquirers, targets, and their rivals from COMPUSTAT.
Identification and coding of rivals’ competitive actions
Using structured content analysis of published news reports and press releases, scholars in
competitive dynamics have developed a systematic procedure to retrieve and code news about a
firm’s competitive moves into different action categories (Smith et al., 2001). Consistent with
this approach, we used Factiva as the news source and conducted a comprehensive search for all
published news reports associated with each firm in our sample over the study time period.
This yielded thousands of news reports that served as the basis for identifying potential
competitive actions. We applied a set of keywords associated with six different types of
competitive actions—pricing, marketing, new products, capacity increases, legal proceedings,
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and overt signaling—examined in prior multi-industry studies to establish our initial set of
competitive actions (Ferrier 2001; Ferrier et al., 1999). Then, following the example of prior
research, we recalibrated the set of action categories to reflect some elements of competitive
behavior unique to the pharmaceutical and med-tech industries. 5 We added four action types
to the initial set of actions: product improvements, promotional campaigns, clinical trials, and
licensing agreements. An example news headline associated with a clinical trials action is:
Bristol-Myers, Liposome Begin Phase II Testing of ABLC Drug. An example of a promotional
action is Eli Lilly to Donate Drugs to Battle Tuberculosis Crisis in Russia. An example of a
pricing action is Abbott Laboratories has lowered prices on about 50 of its injectable anesthetics
and intravenous products. Examples and the keyword coding scheme are presented in Table 1.
------------------------------------------Insert Table 1 about here
------------------------------------------Drawing from announcements of M&As in the SDC database, we also captured acquisition
events as an action category. In addition, we captured and coded two actions typically viewed in
the M&A literature as accommodating to the acquirer: price increases and capacity reductions.
The incidents of both were rare in the industries sampled. They were coded separately and
included in our analyses as control variables for years t, t+1, and t+2. To ensure the reliability of
our coding procedure, two experts in strategic management independently coded a representative
sample (n=300) of news headlines into one of the aforementioned action categories. Using
Perrault and Lee’s (1989) index of reliability, this categorization approach yielded a reliability
index of 0.90, which exceeds the convention of 0.70 (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000).
Dependent variable
We measured competitive aggressiveness with two dimensions. The first—competitive action
volume—captures the number of rival competitive actions carried out in a given year, and has
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received robust support as a measure of this construct (cf., Ferrier et al., 1999; Gnyawali et al.,
2006; Miller and Chen, 1996; Rindova et al., 2010; Young et al., 1996). Our second dimension—
competitive action complexity—is the extent to which the rival’s set of competitive actions taken
in a given year consists of a broad range—as compared to a narrow range—of different action
types. Here, we used a Herfindahl-type index that accounts for the weighted diversity among all
action types (Ferrier et al., 1999; Ferrier, 2001). This index accounts for both the number of
action categories and the degree of concentration—or dispersion—of actions across action
categories. For example, a set of actions consisting mainly of marketing actions is considered a
simple action repertoire. By contrast, a firm engaging in a set of competitive actions that exhibits
a representative balance among the possible action types is more complex.
Our data panel consists of measures for competitive action volume and competitive action
complexity for each acquirer’s top ten rivals for three years during and following an acquisition.
Yet, for our analyses, we used the change in a rival’s volume and complexity scores one and two
years following an acquisition event. For example, a rival’s change in action volume is
represented as action volume in year t+1 minus action volume in year t, and so on. This enabled
us to capture increasing or decreasing levels of competitive aggressiveness in our analyses.
Independent variables
Market dependence. Similar to Gimeno’s (1999) approach, we calculated market dependence as
the percentage of the rival's sales derived in the primary SIC code of the acquirer relative to the
rival’s total revenue. High scores indicate higher dependence on the focal market. The data were
obtained for the year prior to the acquisition from the COMPUSTAT segments database.
Resource similarity. Consistent with prior studies in competitive dynamics, we calculate our
measure of resource similarity between rival and acquirer for every acquisition. These studies
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use a Euclidean distance measure across several dimensions, pairwise with the rival and acquirer
(Gimeno and Woo, 1996; Upson et al., 2012; Young et al., 2000). The variables chosen to
compare resources ideally are both generalizable to other industries but also reflect salient
resource positions particular to the industry studied. We selected four dimensions to include in
our composite score for resource similarity. First, firm size, measured as total assets, is a
powerful explanatory variable that reflects strategic capabilities, product-market strategies, and
network strength (Josefy et al., 2015; Gimeno and Woo, 1996). Second, technological intensity,
measured as the percentage of R&D spending divided by revenue, is particularly important in the
pharmaceutical, biotech, and med-tech industries because of the risks and rewards associated
with the new innovative treatments developed, and the extent to which firms choose to invest in
innovative capabilities (Das and Teng, 1998). Third, marketing and advertising intensity,
measured by the marketing budget divided by revenue, indicates the capabilities of the firms to
push their products to their customer base, a dimension with wide variance in the focal
industries. Finally, market-specific experience, measured as the number of years each firm has
operated in the primary SIC code of the acquirer, captures the industry specific human capital
and experience imprinted within the firm (Barney, 1991; Castanias and Helfat, 2001; Gimeno
and Woo, 1996). The similarity score was calculated consistent with Gimeno and Woo (1996),
for dimension d with rival r and acquirer a for acquisition q over the set of the four dimensions
described above, s1 –s4. We subtracted the resultant resource distance score from 1 so that higher
scores indicate resource similarity, as opposed to resource distance.
4

Similarityraq = 1 –

∑ (drs – das)2
S=1
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We also tested the effects of alternative combinations of these resource dimensions, as well as
individual elements of our composite score. These efforts yielded substantively similar results.
Yet, we included the composite measure with the four aforementioned dimensions because of its
robust representation of resource similarity in our respective industries and because of its
discriminant validity relative to our control variables.
Organizational slack. To measure the level of resources available for a rival to use in responding
to a competitor’s actions, we calculated organizational slack as the ratio of working capital to
sales (Bourgeois and Singh, 1983; Chakravarthy, 1986; Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1988). An
alternative measure of slack, SGA to sales, produced essentially identical results.
Relatedness. We measured the moderating variable employing a 3 point scale- 0=unrelated
(same 2 digit SIC code or less), 1=related-diversified (same 3 digit SIC code), and 2=horizontal
(same 4 digit SIC code).
Control variables. Because size significantly influences firm actions, we controlled for the size
of the acquirer (Josefy et al., 2015). We used the log of total sales as a measure of acquirer size.
Small acquisitions are likely to produce fewer responses by the rivals, so we controlled for
acquisition size as the log of the dollar value of the transaction. Given the close relationship
between size and slack, we controlled for rival size (the log of total assets) in order to identify
the effect of slack on the implementation of actions. Because there may be different industryspecific reasons for acquisitions, we controlled for industry at the four-digit SIC code level of the
acquirer with dummy variables.
Financial constraints impact competitive actions. Thus we controlled for capital and advertising
intensity, which are substantial in the pharmaceutical industry, and research shows them to be
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important for complexity (Hughes-Morgan et al., 2010; Andrevski et al, in press). We measured
capital intensity as the rival’s net fixed assets to total book assets, and advertising intensity as the
rival’s advertising spending to total sales in the year prior to the acquisition.
Further, we controlled for several variables that indicate the ability of the acquirer to effectively
integrate the new entity as it could prompt rivals to respond in a more aggressive manner. As
greater acquisition experience can ease acquisition integration, we controlled for the previous
acquisition experience of the acquirer using the count of acquisitions by the acquirer over the last
ten years (Barkema and Schijven, 2008). As this attribute of the rival might influence its
competitive aggressiveness we also controlled for the acquisition experience of the rival as the
count of acquisitions over the last ten years. We controlled for pre-acquisition performance of
the acquirer, measured as the return on equity for the year prior to the acquisition because prior
firm performance may affect the ability to integrate the acquisition. We controlled for target
performance as well, using the return on equity for the year prior to the acquisition. We
controlled for pre-acquisition performance of the rival, measured as the return on equity for the
year prior to the acquisition because this may affect the ability of the rival to respond.
Because the focal acquisition might be a response to a previous acquisition by a rival, we
controlled for the time since the last acquisition in the industry (time since last acq.). Also,
because several firms appear among the top 10 rivals in numerous acquisition cases and thus
might respond extraordinarily aggressively, we control for this possibility with the number of
times a firm appeared as one of the top 10 rivals to an acquirer (rival appearances). Due to
difference in performance levels across the three industries that may affect the capability of firms
to respond, we controlled for average industry performance for the three years after the
acquisition (Ellis et al., 2011). As mentioned earlier, we controlled for rival accommodating
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actions, such as price increases and capacity reductions. We initially controlled for previous
alliances between acquirer and target, but found only few such cases in the SDC JV database
with no effect, so this variable was omitted from later analyses.

Analysis and results
The unit of analysis for our study is the rival firm. Our data are structured such that each
acquisition event corresponds to the competitive aggressiveness variables (action volume and
action complexity) and organizational attributes (e.g., rival size, rival performance) of the top 10
rivals. This gives rise to repeated occurrences of acquirer attributes in the analyses. To account
for this, we used generalized estimating equations (GEE) with the acquisition as the subject
variable and each rival’s competitive actions as the within-subject variables. GEE uses weighted
combinations of observations to extract the appropriate amount of information from correlated
data (Hanley et al., 2003). For model-fit statistics, we use the quasi-likelihood-based modelselection criterion (QIC) of the full model and compare it with the QIC statistic for the base
model that includes only the controls. We found that adding the independent variables improves
fit in models with significant results (Pan, 2001). Means, standard deviations, and correlations
are reported in Table 2. Results of the GEE regression analyses are reported in Table 3.
-------------------------------------------Insert Table 2 about here
-------------------------------------------Hypothesis 1 predicted that a rival’s dependence on the acquirer’s primary market would be
positively related to an increase in the rival’s competitive aggressiveness. Our analysis indeed
finds that market dependence of a rival is a positive and statistically significant predictor of its
change in competitive action volume in both year one and year two following the acquisition.
This indicates that when rivals are reliant on the markets in which a competitor makes an

26
acquisition, they evidently responded quickly with an increase in the number of competitive
moves, and continue this aggressiveness in the second year. There was no statistically significant
relationship with competitive action complexity. Thus, the results provide moderate support for
Hypothesis 1 with a greater number of competitive actions.
Hypothesis 2 predicted that resource similarity between the acquirer and rivals would be
positively related to an increase in the rival’s level of competitive aggressiveness. Our analysis
finds that resource similarity of a rival is a positive and statistically significant predictor of its
change in competitive action volume in both year one and year two following the acquisition.
Thus, as for market dependence, rivals appeared to initially respond with an increase in the
number of competitive moves and continue this aggressiveness in the second year. There was no
statistically significant relationship with competitive action complexity. Thus, the results provide
moderate support for Hypothesis 1 with a greater number of competitive actions.
Hypothesis 3 predicted that rivals’ organizational slack increases the likelihood they will engage
in aggressive competitive responses subsequent to the merger undertaken by their competitor. As
reported in Table 3, slack is a positive and statistically significant predictor of an increase in
competitive action volume in the year immediately following the acquisition, however not in the
second year. Slack is also positively and significantly associated with an increase in competitive
action complexity in the second year following the acquisition, but not in the first. These results
suggest that rivals’ level of slack increases their competitive responses in both the short and long
term, with an immediate increase in the number of actions carried out, and a longer term increase
in the variety of actions, providing support for hypothesis 3.
-------------------------------------------Insert Table 3 about here
-------------------------------------------
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Hypotheses 4a and 4b predicted that the relatedness of an acquisition would moderate the
relationships between market dependence and aggressiveness, and resource similarity and
aggressiveness, respectively. Based on the coefficient for the relatedness - market dependence
interaction terms in Table 4, we find partial support for 4a, as related acquisitions moderate the
relationship between market dependence and competitive action but only for response
complexity in the second year. 6 For ease of interpretation, we graphed interaction effects as
shown in Figure 2. Specifically, the upward slope for the high relatedness condition is reflective
of the predicted main effect (H1) between market dependence and year t+2 action repertoire
complexity. Yet, in low relatedness acquisitions the slope of the market dependence–complexity
relationship is negative.
We find stronger support for hypothesis 4b, however. As shown in Table 5, the coefficients for
the moderating effects are statistically significant for change in action complexity in both years
subsequent to the acquisition. These interactions are depicted in Figure 3. Specifically, related
acquisitions are associated with an increase in the positive slope of the resource similarity–
complexity relationship. Yet, in low relatedness acquisitions the slope of the resource similarity–
action complexity relationship is negative for both post-acquisition years. None of the
interactions tested, however, affected the volume of rival responses.
-------------------------------------------------------------Insert Tables 4-5; Figures 2-3 about here
-------------------------------------------------------------Robustness test
To test the robustness of our findings and demonstrate a direct link between an acquisition and
aggressive rival reactions, we conducted an event study identifying stock market (i.e., investors’)
assessments of firm actions (e.g., announcement of an acquisition). The intensity of rivalry is
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critical for firm performance (Chen, 1996; Porter, 1980) and stock prices are affected by rival
actions (Ferrier and Lee, 2002). Thus, investors likely take the probability of aggressive rival
response to an acquisition into consideration when evaluating the value of the acquisition for the
acquirer. Investors have access to information on rival awareness, motivation and capability to
respond to a merger. Following the example of previous M&A studies (e.g., Haleblian et al.,
2009), we used event study methodology to identify the abnormal returns associated with the
announcement of all acquisitions in our sample. We used the approach recommended by
McWilliams and Siegel (1997) to measure the abnormal stock price returns of the firms. Using
an estimation period preceding the event 250 to 50 days as recommended by McWilliams and
Siegel (1997), we included the returns within a three-day window that includes the day of the
acquisition as well as the day before and after. Subsequently, we used the abnormal returns as the
dependent variable in our GEE regression analysis instead of the rivals’ reactions.
We found that investors’ reactions were largely consistent with our findings: the results suggest
that investors expect rivals to respond to an acquisition given market dependence, reducing the
expected returns to the acquisition. That is, market dependence was associated negatively with
abnormal returns to merger. We found the same result for rival slack. However, results for
resource similarity were not statistically significant. Investors seem less concerned with resource
similarity as a driver of aggressive competitive reaction to acquisition. Findings related to the
moderating effects, however, demonstrated that those investors were concerned about the
resource similarity with a related acquisition. The results for the interaction involving market
dependence were not a statistically significant predictor of market returns. These findings
indicate support for the robustness of the findings related to our hypotheses.
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Discussion and conclusions
To understand weak returns to mergers, research largely focused on a cost-benefit analysis
limited to conditions internal to the merger and the merging firms, such as takeover premiums
and high integration costs. Research also suggests that mergers can create synergies based on
complementary resources, economies of scale and scope, and other benefits that help achieve or
maintain a competitive advantage. Yet, most of this work assumes a static competitive landscape,
although they are dynamic, and shifts are often driven by acquisitions. Without an understanding
of the external competitive context, we limit our power to explain the outcomes of M&As.
Given the potential competitive strengths an acquirer can gain from an acquisition, rivals can be
expected to engage in aggressive competitive responses (actions) that limit or eliminate these
anticipated advantages. Some research finds that rivals may accommodate mergers because they
could receive peripheral benefits due to industry consolidation. But, competitive dynamics
theory and anecdotal evidence suggest that rivals can also be threatened or harmed by
competitors’ acquisitions. This study has highlighted conditions under which rivals appear to
react aggressively to an acquisition, in contrast to prevailing theory in finance and economics.
Based on research in competitive dynamics, we found that under certain conditions related to
rivals’ awareness and motivation—estimated by market dependence of rivals common with
acquirers and resource similarity within the rival-acquirer dyad—, and rivals’ capability—
estimated by their organizational slack—, they increase the number of competitive actions
carried out subsequent to a competitor’s merger or acquisition. This increase in total actions is
often sustained for somewhat longer periods. These findings complement those from prior
research about the role of market dependence and resource similarity in competitive responses

30
(e.g., Chen and MacMillan, 1992; Chen et al., 1992; Chen et al., 2007; Yu and Cannella, 2007).
Moreover, when rivals have organizational slack, they may even respond with a broader
repertoire of actions. This, however, is observed only in the second year following the
acquisition which suggests that it takes time to decide on, develop, and carry out a
comprehensive counter-attack. Our general findings suggest that future research should examine
acquisitions as a strategic action within a dynamic, competitive environment.
Further, our findings suggest that the complexity of rival responses based on resource similarity
(and to a lesser degree based on market dependence) is influenced by the relatedness of the
acquisition. Seemingly firms that perceive an increase in competitive tension from a competitor’s
acquisition are incentivized to react with a more complex response repertoire when the
acquisition is related and thus creates an additional, more immediate threat to the rival. Likewise,
less related mergers appear to reduce competitive tension making resource similarity less
important. Previous findings showing accommodative behavior by rivals focused on industries in
which horizontal (i.e., highly related) acquisitions are more common (e.g., commercial airlines).
Potentially, accommodation through prices increases subsequent to merger may help fund other
types of aggressive behavior, such as marketing or product actions. Alternatively, differences
between industries may explain the extent to which industry-consolidating acquisitions are
accommodated or aggressively contested—a question ripe for future research.
Viewed through the lens of competitive dynamics, our study contradicts many previous findings
suggesting that rivals generally accommodate M&As. On a broader level, our research indicates
that collusive behavior anticipated with acquisitions (Chatterjee, 1986; Kim and Singal, 1993)
may result from the lack of awareness, motivation, and/or ability of rivals to react. Under
conditions where rivals have significant resources to respond to a competitor’s acquisition, or
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when rivals consider an acquisition to be a threat to their market position, they are unlikely to
accommodate a competitor’s acquisitive actions; instead, they respond with a heightened number
of actions, perhaps with greater breadth and complexity. These rival responses contribute to our
understanding of acquirers achieving approximately zero or only small positive returns from
acquisitions (Song and Walking, 2000). The inconsistent results from prior research regarding
the effect of acquisitions on competitive pressures in industries may be resolved with a richer
understanding of acquiring firms’ and rivals’ characteristics, and the competitive landscape in
which they operate. Accordingly, our study provides a foundation for the previously
underexplored external context of M&As (Haleblian et al., 2009; Wan and Yiu, 2009).
Our research extends our understanding of competitive dynamics by exploring new drivers of
competitive behavior (Chen and Miller, 2012; Smith et al., 2001). In general, our findings
provide additional support for the AMC framework and highlight the value and generalizability
of insights gained by work in competitive dynamics to the domain of corporate strategic actions.
Although some of our findings mirror those from some prior research that adopted the actionresponse dyad level of action aggregation (e.g., Chen and MacMillan, 1992), we found that by
adopting a hybrid action-repertoire view of competitive response—a single competitive action
provokes a competitive repertoire response—our results partially contradict findings from other
extant research. This demonstrates the value of exploring a repertoire complexity response to
competitive actions. Further, whereas prior research has explored the relationships among a
variety of organizational, managerial, competitive, and industry attributes and competitive
repertoires (Gnyawali et al., 2006; Miller and Chen, 1994; 1996), our study is among the first to
explore these effects over time. Indeed, we found differential effects between the organizational
and competitive context variables in our models on action volume versus complexity over time.
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Moreover, the influence of acquisition relatedness suggests a critical contextual condition for the
responses to this unique competitive action. It also lends early empirical support to recent theory
associated with factor market rivalry (Markman et al., 2009).
Our research suggests that corporate-level strategy research needs to inculcate competitive
rivalry similar to scholarly work on business-level strategy. We show that the two levels are not
independent; rather, they appear to be interdependent, an important result for understanding the
strategic outcomes. Aggressive business-level competitive actions may well be provoked by
corporate-level actions of competitors. This supports our understanding of factor market rivalry
suggesting that factor market actions, such as acquisitions, may exacerbate product market
rivalry (Markman et al., 2009). Conversely, a competitive dynamics perspective of M&As could
be extended by taking into account the product level. In addition to competing on the business
and corporate level, pharmaceutical firms also compete on specific drugs, e.g., Pfizer’s Lipitor
against other cholesterol-reducing treatments. Therefore, rivals may respond to acquisitions in
market segments in which they compete, as well as at the industry level. Our research
specifically extends the emerging theoretical framework of competitive dynamics into a new,
important strategic context, M&As, broadening the support for the AMC framework (Chen,
1996; Chen et al., 2007), and provides evidence on the implications of factor market rivalry
(Markman et al., 2009; Chatain and Capron, 2008).
Our study also has significant implications for managerial practice. Previous research found
accommodation as typical rival response to acquisitions. However, our research suggests rivals
may react aggressively, depending on rivals’ awareness, motivation and capability to do so.
Investors are also aware of this additional risk associated with acquisitions. Acquiring firm
managers should be cognizant of the potential for rivals to react aggressively, even with the
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complex internal challenges typically present in executing M&As. Further, managers might
consider signaling to rivals that a specific acquisition is not an aggressive strategic move, but
creates opportunities to reduce the level of competition within their industry, in order to prompt
accommodating rather than aggressive rival responses (Chen and Miller, 1994).
Limitations
Although our study includes a broader set of industries than Kim and Singal’s (1993), our
research is still limited to a set of related industries. Certainly, our results suggest that the Kim
and Singal (1993) findings may be idiosyncratic to the airline industry or may stem from
industry-wide characteristics typical of transportation industries that are not representative of the
medical (and related) industries. Future research could fruitfully explore how industry attributes
(via multi-industry studies) impact the aggressiveness of competitive reactions to M&As and
consolidation is warranted. Multi-industry studies could also better examine rival reactions to
diversifying acquisitions.
Our study also was unable to determine with certainty the intentionality of rival actions or if the
focal acquisition actually was a response to a previous action by a rival. We attempted to
minimize this concern by (a) using the change in rival actions, including change in competitive
action repertoire, in years subsequent to the acquisition relative to pre-acquisition actions rather
than absolute values as our dependent variables; by (b) limiting our sample to large firms that are
unambiguously direct rivals with each other; by (c) using an event study as a robustness test that
more tightly links rival responses with a specific acquisition event; and by (d) controlling for the
time since the last acquisition in the industry before the focal one. In addition, the significant
findings for hypothesis 4 are an indication that the rival actions indeed are associated with the
acquisition; otherwise the main effects we found would not have been modified by the
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acquisition relatedness. Nevertheless, more direct measures need to be developed for research on
acquisitions and competitive dynamics surrounding them. Measurement issues might also
contribute to weaker than expected findings for some of our main effects. For instance, with
respect to the measurement of resource similarity, future research might take into consideration
additional resource attributes, such as their mobility and versatility (Markman et al., 2009).
In conclusion, our findings indicate that further development of theory on the returns to M&As is
needed. For instance, research could examine the link between competitive responses to an
acquisition and post-merger performance of the acquirer. Further, the competitive environment
of acquirers should be considered. While we have identified some conditions that can increase
the likelihood of aggressive competitive response to acquisitions, further work should examine
additional motives and identify the abilities of rivals to undertake effective responses to
competitors’ acquisitions. For instance, scholars might consider additional industry conditions.
In industries with short product life cycles, firms have limited time to recoup investments and
competitive disadvantages must be eradicated rapidly to avoid major financial losses. An
acquisition resulting in a significant advantage for the merged firm may lead to significantly
higher returns, likely at the expense of rivals with little time to offset the consequences. Thus, in
these markets, competitive advantage is rarely sustainable (Hitt et al., 2011). Because the
consequences are of immediate significance to rivals in these fast-cycle markets, acquisitions are
likely to produce swift and strong competitive responses. Taken together, this study adds new
evidence to help us understand the returns experienced from acquisitions and advocates a new
stream of research integrating scholarly work on M&As with research on competitive dynamics.
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1

Several studies examined the effect of M&A activity on rivals’ stock returns (Eckbo, 1983;

Song and Walking, 2000). While this work revealed some positive effects, findings were
interpreted as not resulting from collusive, anticompetitive behavior, but instead as an
information/signaling effect whereby rivals of acquisition targets are considered more likely to
become takeover targets themselves. Alternatively, Gaur, Malhotra, and Zhu (2013) observed
that acquisitions in China indicate industry growth potential. Both effects may boost rivals’ stock
returns.
2

Here, we use the term level of action aggregation to distinguish it from level of analysis. It

simply refers to a variety of constructs and associated measures reflective of different ways
competitive actions are grouped together (Smith et al., 1991; Chen and Miller, 2012).
3

Here, we deliberately introduce the term rival to delineate which focal firm—among all other

rival firms to the acquiring firm—has responded to the acquisition events in our analyses.
4

Competitive actions of different types vary in terms of important attributes: Strategic (vs.

tactical), magnitude, scope, noteworthiness, visibility, implementation requirement, and
irreversibility (Smith et al., 2001). Prior research suggests that these properties impact the
likelihood, speed, and type of response (Chen and MacMillan, 1992; Chen et al., 1992; Smith et
al., 1991). Based on this logic, we argue that acquisitions (as a type of competitive action not
previously studied) are likely to exhibit all these properties and, consequently, are likely to
influence rival competitive aggressiveness.
5

Early research in competitive dynamics focused on airline industry-specific types of

competitive actions (e.g., Miller & Chen, 1994). More recent research developed and tested
reliable sets of action types specific to, for example, the steel industry (Gnyawali et al., 2006),
computer software (Young et al., 1996), the automotive industry (Yu and Cannella, 2007), and
the internet industry (Rindova et al., 2010). Other studies developed a set of actions carried out
in a range of different industries (Ferrier et al., 1999).
6

Due to multicollinearity concerns we analyzed the effects of the relatedness x market

dependence and relatedness x resource similarity interactions in separate regression models.
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Figure 1. Drivers of rival response aggressiveness
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Figure 2. Effects on rival aggressiveness of the interaction of market dependence and relatedness
of acquisition
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Figure 3 a, b. Effects on rival aggressiveness of the interaction of resource similarity and type of
acquisition
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Table 1. Action types coding keywords and example headlines
Action type

Content analysis
coding scheme

Examples of headlines from news reports

Keywords: price cut discount change
(those raising prices were excluded)

‘Abbott Laboratories has lowered prices on
about 50 of its drugs (mostly injectable
anesthetics and intravenous products).’

Keywords: advertise commercial
television campaign spot

‘Interneuron Pharmaceuticals announces
alliance with American Cyanamid to market
anti-obesity product’

Keywords: introduce launch unveil roll out
approve

‘Haemonetics Launches New Mobile Plasma
Collection Technology in Japan’

Keywords: raises boosts increase expand
(those reducing capacity were excluded)

‘Alpharma Reaches Agreement to Expand
Vancomycin Capacity’

Legal
Proceedings

Keywords: sue litigate settle infringement

‘Allergan Sues Santen Pharmaceutical Alleges
Rights Infringement’

Signaling

Keywords: vows promises says seeks aims

‘Elan restructuring aims to please market.’

Keywords: improve enhance update
change

‘Systematic Tooling Analysis Improves
Warner-Lambert Product Transfer’

Keywords: donate contest
sponsor promote

‘Eli Lilly To Donate Drugs To Battle
Tuberculosis Crisis In Russia’

Keywords: phase clinical trial

‘Bristol-Myers Liposome Begin Phase II
Testing Of ABLC Drug’

Keywords: license contract

‘Boston Scientific to License Its Ultrasound
Technology’

Pricing

Marketing

New Products

Capacity
Increases

Product
Improvements
Promotion
Clinical trial
Licensing
Acquisitions

From SDC database
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Table 2. Correlations and descriptive statistics
Std.
Mean Dev. 1
1. Acquirer Size
4.21 1.28
2. Acquisition Size
1.82 1.06 .100**
3. Rival Size
4.36 .814 .031*
4. Advertising Intensity
0.12 0.34 -.113**
5. Capital Intensity
0.05 0.02 .153**
6. Relatedness
0.92 0.65 .067**
7. Previous Acq. Experience 20.97 17.15 -.135**
8. Rival Experience
29.51 19.41 -.118**
9. Time Since Last Acq.
4.12 0.89 .050**
10. Rival # of Appearances 327.23 64.39 .134**
11. Pre-Acq. Performance
0.05 0.26 -.003
12. Target Performance
0.03 0.01 -.108**
13. Industry Performance
0.07 0.12 .159**
14. Rival Performance
0.06 0.17 -.007
15. Accomodating Actions
0.28 0.52 .007
16. Market Dependence
0.57 0.45 -.031*
17. Resource Similarity
0.56 0.54 .127**
18. Organizational Slack
0.25 0.18 -.038**
19. Change in Volume t+1
1.25 12.65 .021
20. Change in Volume t+2
0.52 10.63 -.005
21. Change in Complexity t+1 0.02 0.16 .005
22. Change in Complexity t+2 0.02 0.14 -.006
* p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

.003
-.030*
-.008
.166**
-.057**
.135**
.017
-.011
.200**
-.121**
.132**
.001
-.006
-.047**
.079**
.006
.018
-.013
.003
.010

-.008
.029
.050**
-.036*
-.040
-.025
.044**
-.130**
-.030*
-.018
.042*
-.007
.049**
-.006
-.012
-.008
.021
-.009
.018

-.230**
-.009
.001
-.035*
.013
.035*
-.009
.011
-.006
.048**
-.025
-.034*
-.022
.098**
-.009
.002
.012
.033*

-.006
.004
-.084**
.006
.018
.001
-.005
.029
.091**
.023
.004
-.010
-.125**
.012
.022
-.039*
.001

-.199**
.022
-.047**
-.042**
.180**
-.022
-.063**
.001
-.004
.209**
.032*
-.009
.009
.014
.023
-.005

.194**
.097**
-.038*
.336**
.056**
.034*
.002
.001
.160**
.026
.007
.014
.028
-.040*
.005

.181**
-.007
.482**
-.056*
.227**
-.016
.002
.188**
-.266**
.008
.062
-.103
-.040
-.011

.078**
-.099**
.023
-.010
.001
-.012
-.004
.060**
-.001
.024
-.014
.027
.001

.210**
-.026
-.004
-.012
.002
-.067**
.083**
-.032*
-.016
-.013
.028
-.036*

.011
.260**
.021
.006
-.121**
.006
.016
-.053*
-.029
.037
.001

-.003
.001
.021
-.020
-.020
.021
.005
-.016
.018
-.001

.001
-.010
-.041*
.057**
.005
-.030*
.006
.003
-.018

-.006
.038*
-.018
.014
-.019
-.018
-.033*
-.016

.033*
-.002
-.013
.029*
.016
.028
-.006

-.073**
-.045**
.029*
.012
.004
.021

.022
.042**
.020
.008
-.022

18

19

20

21

.112**
.038** .028
-.037* -.037* .003
.028 .023 .140** -.088**
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Table 3. Regression analysis – main effects†
Variables

Change in Competitive Action Volume
t+1

Change in Competitive Action Complexity

t+2

t+1

t+2

Coeff

SE

Coeff

SE

Coeff

SE

Coeff

SE

Acquirer Size

-1.106

1.036

-.337

.848

.009

.016

.011

.022

Acquisition Size

.838

.783

1.256*

.750

-.006

.007

-.005

.006

Rival Size

-1.090*

.629

-.752

.814

-.005

.009

.007

.009

Advertising Intensity

-2.581

1.685

-.049

1.899

.050

.052

.057**

.018

Capital Intensity

32.310

23.099

38.106*

20.320

.020

.426

1.061*

.473

Relatedness

.533

.752

1.312

1.191

.004

.007

.014**

.005

Previous Acq. Experience

.208

.483

-.099

.544

-.008

.006

.003

.005

Rival Experience

-1.315

1.129

.301

1.127

-. 022*

.009

.001

.006

Time Since Last Acq.

-4.088

5.362

4.132

6.872

.072*

.037

-.077*

.038

Rival Appearances

.599

2.756

-1.475

1.597

-.001

.022

-.050*

.024

Pre-Acq. Performance

5.916

4.390

-4.456

6.144

-.080*

.035

.037

.035

Target Performance

-5.546

4.459

-4.032

5.758

.022

.030

-.017

.040

Industry Performance

5.072

12.629

4.602

12.100

.185**

.067

.015

.078

-10.862

7.160

-1.754

6.153

-.036

.060

-.026

.059

-.630

.845

-.139

.750

-.001

.011

.005

.009

Market Dependence

4.308**

1.568

2.864*

1.480

.020

.018

.014

.012

Resource Similarity

2.877*

1.434

1.897*

.927

.010

.013

.001

.013

Organizational Slack

8.619**

3.445

1.553

2.493

-.035

.046

.096*

.037

GEE Model

Rival Performance
Accommodating Actions

QIC base model

1169.072

908.412

59.687

64.677

QIC full model

1036.352

872.345

53.223

44.836

n = 4220 * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001

† results

for industry dummies omitted
one-tailed tests per directional hypotheses
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Table 4. Regression analysis – moderation market dependence x acquisition relatedness†
Variables

Change in Competitive Action Volume
t+1

Change in Competitive Action Complexity

t+2

Coeff

SE

Acquirer Size

.948

1.025

Acquisition Size

.714

Rival Size

Coeff

t+1

t+2

SE

Coeff

SE

Coeff

SE

.303

.856

.009

.016

.010

.022

.837

1.233

.743

-.006

.007

-.007

.004

-.717

.664

-.684

.815

-.005

.009

.011

.010

Advertising Intensity

-3.128*

1.710

-.145

1.877

.050

.053

.051**

.019

Capital Intensity

25.096

23.497

36.758

23.073

.020

.428

.967*

.472

Relatedness

.882

.759

1.375

1.210

-.012

.008

.032

.033

Previous Experience

-.157

.540

-.165

.571

-.008

.006

-.001

.005

Rival Experience

-1.272

1.127

.310

1.121

.022*

.010

.001

.006

Time Since Last Acq.

-4.911

5.367

3.990

6.860

.072*

.037

-.085*

.038

Rival Appearances

.155

2.686

-1.574

1.618

-.001

.022

-.058**

.024

Prior Performance

4.439

4.954

-4.715

6.190

-.080*

.035

.025

.034

Target Performance

6.118

4.660

-4.122

5.734

.022

.030

-.019

.039

Industry Performance

8.186

12.405

5.162

11.979

.186**

.069

.043

.078

-11.690*

7.100

-1.901

6.157

-.036

.060

-.036

.057

-.594

.835

-.133

.748

-.001

.011

.006

.009

Market Dependence

3.650**

1.5672

2.743*

1.504

.020

.018

.022*

.021

Resource Similarity

2.951*

1.455

1.915*

.919

.010

.013

.002

.013

Organizational Slack

8.188**

3.380

1.479

2.483

-.035

.045

.069

.050

Relatedness x Market
Dependence

-3.338

4.663

-2.412

4.180

.001

.039

.064***

.014

GEE Model

Rival Performance
Accommodating Actions

QIC base model

1036.352

872.345

53.223

44.836

QIC full model

1041.221

842.874

48.822

38.085

n = 4220 * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001

† results

for industry dummies omitted
one-tailed tests per directional hypotheses
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Table 5. Regression analysis – moderation resource similarity x relatedness †
Variables

Change in Competitive Action Volume
t+1

Change in Competitive Action Complexity

t+2

t+1

t+2

Coeff

SE

Coeff

SE

Coeff

SE

Coeff

SE

Acquirer Size

-1.103

1.037

-.339

.848

.009

.016

.011

.022

Acquisition Size

.861

.793

1.235*

.752

-.006

.007

-.007

.005

Rival Size

-1.099*

.632

-.744

.814

-.005

.009

.008

.009

Advertising Intensity

-2.575

1.685

-.054

1.899

.049

.052

.056**

.018

Capital Intensity

32.245

23.104

38.158

23.323

.019

.426

.062*

.032

Relatedness

.516

.760

1.329

1.197

.070

.080

.100*

.064

Previous Acq. Experience

.216

.486

-.106

.546

-.008

.006

.002

.005

Rival Experience

-1.329

1.138

.313

1.129

.022*

.009

.002

.006

Time Since Last Acq.

-4.064

5.369

4.111

6.869

.072*

.037

-.078*

.037

Rival Appearances

.630

2.772

-1.507

1.606

-.002

.022

- .054*

.025

Pre-Acq. Performance

5.899

4.379

-4.440

6.143

-.080*

.035

.038

.034

Target Performance

-5.606

4.460

-3.974

5.753

.023

.030

-.012

.039

Industry Performance

5.055

12.627

4.617

12.074

.186**

.067

.016

.076

-10.810

7.171

-1.801

6.155

-.037

.060

-.031

.059

Accommodating Actions

-.625

.845

-.143

.749

-.001

.011

.005

.009

Market Dependence

4.305**

1.569

2.866*

1.483

.020

.018

.014

.012

Resource Similarity

2.834*

1.424

1.937*

.918

.011

.013

.009

.018

Organizational Slack

8.608*

3.449

1.563

2.492

-.035

.046

.068

.050

Relatedness x Resource
Similarity

-2.604

2.973

2.379

2.506

.047*

.025

.150***

.020

GEE Model

Rival Performance

QIC base model

1036.352

872.345

53.223

44.836

QIC full model

1056.578

852.612

42.782

32.047

n = 4220 * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001

† results

for industry dummies omitted
one-tailed tests per directional hypotheses
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